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As far as we know, all languages have demonstrative elements that can be 
used to ‘verbally point’ at objects. Moreover, all languages have more than 
one pointing variant. Dutch, for example, has two demonstrative variants, 
proximal ‘dit/deze’ WKLV and distal ‘dat/die’ WKDWwhich are typically used 
for near and far objects respectively, but languages can show additional 
variants (e.g. Diessel, 1999; Levinson, 2004). From a historical point of 
view, pointing words are fairly ‘invariable’ elements, not derived or 
emerged from other elements or linguistic categories, as it is pointed out by 
Deutscher (2005: 228): 
 
No matter how hard one tries to trace their historical origin, the pointing words 
in any language never seem to emerge from anything that was not a pointing 
word to start with. Unlike grammatical words, which over and over again can be 
seen to develop from nouns and verbs, pointing words appear to have been 
pointing words all along. 
 
Pointing words also play an important role in language acquisition, in par-
ticular in the development and understanding of a “joint attentional frame” 
(Tomasello, 2003), which enables children to engage in ‘triadic’ social in-
teraction with other humans and objects. Pointing devices are crucial in de-
veloping the humans’ ability to jointly attend to the outside world, and thus 
in the development of language, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. 
This suggests that pointing words are very basic in terms of human 
evolution and may well have emerged directly as vocal accompaniments to 
an actual pointing gesture. In an epical frame of mind, one may think of 
pointing words as being the crucial intermediate step in mankind’s evolu-
tion from “iconic” (e.g. pointing, roaring, grunting and howling) to “sym-
bolic” communication. In more analytical terms, the variation of demon-
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stratives in human language, in particular the SUR[LPDO GLVWDO dichotomy 
captures the basic coordinates of how humans perceive and conceptualize 
their own environment. For example, Kemmerer (1999) reviews studies 
which offer ample evidence that the difference between ‘graspable’ and 
‘non graspable’ distance (or: within and outside arm reach) is deeply en-
coded in the human brain. Likewise, the proximal distal dichotomy cap-
tures the coordinates of each communicative situation. Conversants attrib-
ute the value proximal or distal to objects, dependent on the literal or con-
ceptual nearness of objects to speaker and hearer. Languages show an in-
teresting variation of how they associate demonstratives to the coordination 
points of a communicative situation (Diessel, 1999; Enfield, 2003; Levin-
son, 2004). Demonstrative variants can express the connection with the 
speaker (I here) and the hearer (you there). The proximal term tends to be 
associated with the speaker and nearby objects, the distal terms with the 
conversant or far away objects. A third demonstrative variant can express 
the distance between speaker or hearer, or the location of objects in a more 
fine-grained way (near – intermediate – far), or can be used to express 
more fine-grained perspectives between participants and objects.  
In sum, demonstrative variation is an important topic in understanding 
human communication, given the assumed early emergence of demon-
strative variants in language evolution and acquisition, their omnipresence 
in languages all over the world, their capacity to capture basic spatial ex-
periences of humans and to shape the architecture of communicative inter-
action. 
However consistent and important demonstrative variation may be in 
language, it is less consistently represented on the linguistic research 
agenda. As a research topic, demonstrative variation is almost absent in ar-
eas of linguistics where one would expect it to be relevant. Despite vivid 
discussions on demonstratives (and especially complex demonstratives) in 
renowned journals (such a 1RXV, 6\QWKHVH, (UNHQQWQLV, 0LQG or /LQJXLVWLFV
	3KLORVRSK\demonstrative variance is given hardly any attention in phi-
losophy of language. The reason may be that there is hardly any logical 
calculation involved in the difference between demonstratives (see e.g. 
Kaplan, 1978). Or perhaps the realm of demonstrative variance is tied up 
too much with pragmatic contingencies of human communication. Simi-





psychology on the production and processing of different types of referen-
tial expressions (bound vs. unbound pronouns, marked vs. unmarked pro-
nouns, pronouns vs. nominal expressions etc.) based on theories and as-
sumptions about how expression types indicate different degrees of referent 
availability or different discourse structural constellations. To my knowl-
edge, however, there is no experimental evidence on the production or 
processing of different demonstrative variants. Apparently, these differ-
ences are either too obvious or too subtle to be appropriate variables in 
psycholinguistic experiments. They are too obvious in the case of spatial 
demonstratives, i.e. demonstratives used exophorically or contrastively in a 
space based setting. One does not need a full-fledged experimental set up to 
conclude that a task sentence like (1) is processed and executed more effi-
ciently in a setting with the WKLVentity nearer to the speaker than the WKDW
entity, rather than the other way around.  
 
(1) Give me WKLV and then WKDW.  
 
On the other hand, interpretation differences are extremely subtle in the 
case of what will be termed here ‘conceptual’ demonstratives, i.e. demon-
stratives used to refer or point to entities which are somehow part of the 
discourse (i.e., anaphoric demonstratives, discourse deixis, indirect ana-
phors). It is difficult to come up with an experimental set up that is able to 
elicit production or processing differences between the two versions of a 
simple novel or newspaper sentence like (2) or (3).  
 
(2) He asked for D SDLQNLOOHU, knowing that WKLV PHGLFLQH / WKDW PHGLFLQH 
would be very helpful in the hours to come.  
 
(3) And Madonna will certainly GLHDOLWWOHELW on the stage in Carnegie Hall to-
night, if WKLV/WKDW is possible, of course.  
 
What is lacking here is not only a suitable experimental methodology, but 
also credible hypotheses about the (pragmatic?) differences between the 
demonstrative variants, as a starting point for psycholinguistic experimen-
tation. 
Fortunately, there is linguistic life in between or next to language phi-
losophy and psycholinguistics. Roughly speaking, there are two research 
lines within the field of pragmatics, in which demonstrative variance is 





linguistic point of view, predominantly focusing on the way in which de-
monstrative variants are used in different languages as the basic equipment 
to conceptualize space and in particular to organize the attention space in 
interactive communicative situations (Diessel, 1999; Dixon, 2003; Enfield, 
2003; Levinson, 2004). The goal of this type of research is to study the 
coded semantics of demonstrative variants from a cross-linguistic point of 
view, by using examples from grammars or from more or less controlled 
data collections which enable researchers to explain demonstrative varia-
tion in terms of exophoric factors, such as the position of objects in relation 
to the position and perspective of conversants). 2  
The second research line is located in the realm of discourse studies. 
Its ambition is to find out how demonstrative variants can differentially 
contribute to or enrich the conceptual world evoked in written discourse or 
spoken interaction. Most of this work is based on the analysis of a small 
number of languages, mostly collections of mono- or bilingual written cor-
pora, or attested examples of specific instances of demonstratives, such as 
recognitional WKDW, cataphoric WKLVor indefinite WKLV.  
These studies largely conclude that distance or space is hardly ever 
relevant in the interpretation of conceptual demonstratives, as they are 
hardly ever used to express a contrast between objects or differences in 
physical location or distance. As I pointed out for Dutch demonstratives 
previously, the only possible interpretation of distance, i.e. the distance be-
tween an anaphoric demonstrative and its antecedent, is not able to explain 
the differential distribution of proximal and distal elements in written dis-
course (Maes, 1996: 114). Instead, a large number of factors are brought to 
the fore to claim or explain the functional variance of demonstratives. 
Roughly speaking, and disregarding a considerable degree of overlap, two 
types of explanatory notions can be distinguished.  
First, there are notions that express the position of the entity referred 
to within the dynamic development of discourse. Thus, Ariel (1990) attrib-
utes a higher degree of accessibility to WKLV than to WKDW entities and for 
Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993), WKLV-NPs are more ‘given’ than 
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WKDW-NPs. A notable exception is the indefinite use of WKLV which allows 
speakers to introduce new entities vividly (Prince, 1981). Other authors at-
tribute more saliency to WKLVentities than to WKDWentities, capturing the dif-
ference in terms like focus (Gerner, 2003; McCarthy, 1994; Sidner, 1983; 
Webber, 1991), markedness (Halliday & Hasan, 1976), figure-ground 
(Hanks, 1992), or deictic force (Kirsner, 1979).  
The second series of notions explains demonstrative variation in terms 
of different conceptual associations or dissociations between entities and 
communication partners, thus relating the variation to undeniable but at the 
same time hard to control socio-cognitive, relational and perspectival sub-
tleties. For example, WKLVand WKDWare often considered to express some type 
of association with speaker or listener, or a shared assumption about the 
entity (e.g. Cheshire, 1996; Glover, 2000; Kamio, 2001; Laury, 1997; 
Maes, 1996; Marchello-Nizia, 2005). Likewise, particular instances of WKDW
are said to indicate shared knowledge about entities (e.g. reminder or rec-
ognitional ’that’ Cornish, 2001; Himmelmann, 1996), or to express a mental 
distance between speaker and entity (e.g. modal or emotional ’that’ Cornish, 
2001; Lakoff, 1974). Particular instances of WKDWhave been interpreted as 
turn-construction devices in interaction, projecting entities to the front of an 
interaction turn (Hayashi, 2004).  
In sum, the two fields of research have their own partial view on the 
use and function of demonstratives, either focusing on the ‘original’ func-
tion of spatial demonstratives or on the gamut of fine-grained interactional 
and discourse structural functions of what is called here conceptual demon-
stratives. This divide is further emphasized by differences in the (predomi-
nantly analytical) methods used: spatial demonstratives are mainly studied 
across languages using elicited conversational data, whereas conclusions 
about conceptual demonstratives are mainly based on the in-depth analysis 
of attested specific examples coming from a wide realm of contexts or the 




Scholars in the field of spatial cognition, who study demonstrative variation 
from a universal and cross linguistic point of view, may consider the dis-





dary, opaque and fragmented to be helpful in understanding how humans 
use demonstrative elements in conceptualizing the world. Conversely, re-
searchers who study the wealth of pragmatic contexts in which demonstra-
tives play their part, may well believe that “space is just one, perhaps even 
a secondary or derived dimension of deictic reference” (e.g. Blühdorn, 
1995; Matras, 1998). This way of presenting things threatens to introduce a 
false dichotomy and to obscure an important generalization in the under-
standing of demonstratives, i.e. that all demonstratives are rooted in one 
cognitive source of interpretation which is based on space.  
Different arguments can be put forward for such a spatial meaning of 
demonstratives. Despite the fact that word forms for spatial and conceptual 
demonstratives may differ (superficially) in a few languages, as e.g. in 
Romani (Matras, 1998), languages overwhelmingly use the same word 
forms for spatial and conceptual demonstratives. In all languages, the spa-
tial interpretation of demonstratives is clear-cut and uncontroversial, and so 
is the class of ‘situational’ or ‘exophoric’ demonstratives in linguistic tax-
onomies of demonstratives. Moreover, spatial demonstratives tend to be 
morphologically less complex and syntactically less restricted than other 
deictic forms in language (Diessel, 1999).  
The crucial argument for a unified account comes from the observa-
tion that space is an extremely strong template for the conceptualization of 
meaningful things, not only in contemporary language use (e.g.Gibbs, 
2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) but also in language evolution, because 
“metaphors have drifted from the domain of space into absolutely every-
where in language” (Deutscher, 2005: 138). The application range of spa-
tial metaphors is extremely wide; it starts with the spatial origin of gram-
matical elements (like LQ or EDFN and ends up in a mass of conceptualiza-
tions in which spatial experiences are used to create instrumental or rhet-
orically appealing metaphors which enable humans to understand the in-
visible and the abstract (OLIH LV D MRXUQH\ K\SHUVSDFH /HEHQVUDXP WRS
VSRUW IDUIHWFKHG DUJXPHQWV P\ SDWK RI OLIH D QHDU RU IDU DZD\ IULHQG 
etc.).  
The strong coding of spatial demonstratives in all human languages, 
together with the cognitive preference of humans to package and under-
stand abstract concepts in terms of spatial bodily experiences (Glenberg, 





make it plausible that in any context demonstratives bring in spatial mean-
ing, and with it the capacity to metaphorically extend and apply this mean-
ing to a wide range of conceptualizations.  
 
3UHVHQFHSUHVXSSRVLWLRQDQGWKHQHDUIDULPDJHVFKHPH
The spatial source of demonstratives can be accounted for by two theoreti-
cal vehicles: demonstratives presuppose the presence of the object referred 
to, and they activate the QHDUIDU image scheme. The presence presupposi-
tion states that demonstratives presuppose the presence of the object re-
ferred to in a referential domain which is accessible to the participants3. 
This domain can be conceptualized using the physical environment or any 
other conceptual space evoked in the discourse. 
On this view, differences between demonstrative terms can be interpreted 
as associations of objects with different referential domains.  
 
(4) 3UHVHQFHSUHVXSSRVLWLRQRI'HPRQVWUDWLYHVLQ'XWFK
A demonstrative requires the object to be present in a referential domain which 
is relevant and accessible to the participants 

(5) 7KLVa1($5
7KLV expresses the association of the entity with one or more coordination 
point(s) of the discourse deictic referential domain (speaker, time, place, dis-
course) 
7KDWa)$5
7KDW expresses the association of the referent with one or more coordination 
point(s) of another referential domain (reader, time, place, discourse) 
 
Differences between WKLVand WKDWdomains can be conceptualized using the 
QHDUIDU image scheme. The notion of image scheme is used in cognitive 
linguistics as a powerful tool to explain the way in which we conceptualize 
events and experiences in language. Image schemes are schematic repre-
sentations of bodily experiences (Croft & Cruse, 2004). Applied to the 
QHDUIDU image scheme, this means that we attach ‘embodied’ meaning to 
demonstratrives on the basis of our every day multisensory experiences, not 
only spatial experiences (e.g. QHDU is graspable, vs. IDU is not graspable) but 
                                           
3 For the application of this presupposition to demonstrative nominal anaphors in writ-





also derived experiences that we tend to conceptualize in terms of space 
(QHDU is now, important, precise etc., vs. IDU is then, less-important, vague 
etc.). The strong tendency of humans to conceptualize abstract meaning in 
terms of concrete experiences (e.g. Barsalou, 1999; Gibbs, 2005; Zwaan & 
Madden, 2005), and the primary nature of QHDUand IDUas experiential cate-
gories make a strong case for such a unified account of demonstratives. 
Moreover, the QHDUIDU scheme is basic and strong enough to cover the dif-
ferent conceptualization processes associated with demonstratives in vari-
ous contexts. In terms of cognitive linguistics, the QHDUIDU image scheme 
explains the productivity of demonstratives in terms of the major ‘linguistic 
construal operations’ as they are distinguished in cognitive linguistics 
(Croft & Cruse, 2004: 46): they play a part in processes of atten-
tion/saliency (e.g. WKLV is more in the attention or engagement space than 
WKDW), judgment/comparison (e.g. WKLV is more associated with the figure, 
WKDW with the ground) or perspective/situatedness (e.g. WKLV is associated 
with the perspective of the speaker).  
The QHDUIDU image scheme is cognitively relevant in that QHDUIDU is 
part of the experiential gestalt of our sensorimotor/bodily activities: in 
many of our daily actions and experiences, distance is a core ingredient 
(e.g. JLYLQJDNLVV vs. ZDYLQJWRVRPHRQH). Furthermore, the QHDUIDU axis is 
implemented in our visual system (e.g. in the process of stereopsis), and 
our brain contains separate mechanisms for representing peripersonal 
(within arm reach) and extra personal (outside arm reach) space (Kem-
merer 1999).  
The relative nature of QHDUand IDU as spatial terms is crucial in cap-
turing the pragmatics of demonstratives in terms of the QHDUIDU image 
scheme. It correctly predicts that demonstratives never code absolute space 
or distance, for example WKLVor WKDWmeaning more or less than 1 yard away 
from me. As Kemmerer correctly points out, demonstratives are strong 
enough to escape from any absolute distance interpretation, even the one 
which is cognitively most plausible, i.e. ‘within or outside arm reach4: 
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There is abundant evidence that the referential scope of proximal and distal de-
monstratives is not restricted by the boundaries of immediate motor behavior; 
rather, these terms encode an abstract language-specific semantic distinction that 
can be used to express a potentially unlimited range of spatial distance contrasts by 
virtue of being modulated by particular pragmatic contexts. (Kemmerer 1999: 46). 
 
There are many natural occurrences of WKLV demonstratives referring to ob-
jects outside arm reach and WKDW demonstratives referring to objects within 
arm reach (or any other absolute distance parameter). But the relative na-
ture of QHDUand IDUalso predicts that in using demonstratives the ‘literal’ 
distance axis can be overruled by other conceptualizations of the QHDUIDU
scheme. Take example (6), in which the demonstratives are inconsistent 
with literal distance in that the doctor uses WKLVto refer to an object which is 
further away from him than from the patient, and the patient uses WKDW to 
refer to his own head5. The example shows that even in their most typical 
and literal distance interpretation, demonstratives require space to be con-
ceptualized in a QHDUand IDUregion, relative to a particular perspective. 
(6) Doctor: Is WKLV where it hurts?  
(pushing with his thumb on the forehead of the patient) 
Patient:  Yes, WKDWis where is hurts. 
 
In sum, a unified account as suggested above starts from a double assump-
tion: (i) each occurrence of a demonstrative carries a spatial meaning, 
based on the QHDUIDUimage scheme, and (ii) no occurrence of a demonstra-
tive directly expresses space. Instead, a demonstrative requires a (physical 
or conceptual) domain to be conceptualized in (at least) two regions. Or put 
lapidarily, all demonstratives are spatial, and no demonstrative is just spa-
tial. So, if we use WKDWto refer to a far away person, to a nearby third person 
in the communicative situation or to a person we hate, different conceptu-
alizations of the same near-far scheme are involved. 
The next section demonstrates how different metaphorical extensions 
of the QHDUIDU scheme capture different conceptualizations associated with 
demonstratives. In the final section, methodological considerations are 
given first to explain why current data and methods are not able to unambi-
                                           





guously falsify or test the proposed account, and second to outline an ex-
perimental setup shedding more light on the interaction of spatial and con-
ceptual aspects of demonstratives 
 
&RQFHSWXDOH[WHQVLRQVRIWKHQHDUIDULPDJHVFKHPH
The QHDUIDU image scheme consists of basically one experiential ingredi-
ent, i.e. the existence of two values or regions on a distance scale. This 
scheme can be metaphorically extended to a large number of scales with (at 
least) two values or regions conceptually corresponding to the original dis-
tance scale.  
 
x perspective (QHDUIDUwith respect to)  
x speaker-hearer orientation (speaker vs. hearer, speaker vs. not speaker, not hearer 
vs. hearer, etc.) 
x direction (from QHDU to IDU or vice versa) 
x time (now vs. not now (earlier/later) 
x temporal order (first vs. second)  
x nuclearity (nucleus vs. satellite) 
x extension (punctual vs. regional) 
x depth (surface vs. deep) 
x uniqueness (unique vs. multiple) 
x importance (important vs. less important) 
x centrality (central vs. less central) 
x visibility (visible vs. invisible – less visible) 
x accuracy (accurate vs. vague) 
x emotional closeness (close vs. distant) 
x concreteness (concrete vs. abstract) 
 
None of these notions is encoded directly in demonstratives. Instead, con-
text creates natural conditions for the extension of the initial encoded 
meaning (QHDU vs. IDU to these notions.  
The strong part of this proposal is its intuitive plausibility. As we will 
see in the concluding section, the weak part is the lack of incontestable em-
pirical validation of the proposal. Thus far, we only have analytical regu-





one demonstrative variant is acceptable. In the following we present a se-
lection of these cases, applied to Dutch.6 
 
1HDUIDUDQGVSHDNHUKHDUHURULHQWDWLRQ
Conceptual relations between speaker and hearer offer the most productive 
extensions of the QHDUIDU image scheme, thus accounting for most of the 
socio-cognitive pragmatic functions of demonstratives mentioned in section 
1. Face-to-face interaction provides the basis for the natural associations 
QHDUVSHDNHU and IDUKHDUHU. On the basis of the analysis of demonstrative 
noun phrases in a large corpus of Dutch written discourse, I have suggested 
an explanation for the distribution of demonstratives in different discourse 
genres, based on the assumed ‘relational mode’ between speaker and ad-
dressee (Maes, 1996): the Dutch proximal is assumed to express an XQ
HTXDO relational mode between speaker and addressee, as it is typically real-
ized in discourse contexts where the speaker takes the podium, communi-
cates from an instructional or expository top-down position to the ad-
dressee or argues with the addressee assuming that the addressee’s agree-
ment or collaboration is not taken for granted7 or expressing that (s)he will 
take responsibility for the way the entity is described. An example in which 
this unequal relational mode is realized is given in (7) 
 
(7) Deze sprankelende wereld van passie, zoals ik dat zou willen noemen, is eigen 
aan de schrijver. 
This sparkling world of passion, as I would like to call it, is peculiar to the 
writer. 
 
The distal demonstrative, on the other hand, expresses the speaker’s move 
towards the addressee, who is regarded as an equal partner, collaborative, 
friendly and understanding. The speaker expects the addressee to know 
what (s)he is talking about, or to be so polite as to agree with the way in 
which the referent is described. These are typical examples fitting in with 
this equal relational mode  
 
                                           
6 We will only use Dutch examples if there are relevant interpretation differences be-
tween Dutch and English. 
7 A similar idea can be found in the difference between negotiable (proximal) and re-





(8) Do you remember those trees standing in the back of our garden?” 
 
(9) All that bullshit, you know.  
 
(10) Die spanning van die twee werelden, begrijp je. 
That tension of those two worlds, you understand  
 
(11) Ken je die grap van de oude zeeman met zijn rode hoed? 
Do you know that joke of the old sailor with his red hat? 
 
This interpretation is related to so-called recognitional WKDWdemonstratives, 
although there is more involved than simply indicating that the addressee 
has common knowledge about the entity, as is witnessed in (11), where the 
speaker typically does not expect the hearer to know the entity referred to. 
Instead, the use of distal demonstratives can best be seen as a general strat-
egy to establish or to express an equal partnership with the addressee. This 
relational idea is congruent with the proportions of demonstrative variants 
in a large number of corpora in Dutch, presented in Table 1 (see for more 
data Maes, 1996: 152). 
 
discourse genre (number of demonstra-
tives) 
% this 
formal instructive leaflet (n=222) 83 
formal instruction manual (n=291) 77 
formal recipes (n=53) 66 
informal instructive writing (n=91) 36 
magazine columns (n=262) 18 
novel (n=328) 12 
informal chat (n=49) 0 
Table 1. Percentages of WKLVdemonstratives in different discourse gen-








Demonstrative variance is often explained by temporal extensions of the 
QHDUIDUscheme. Most typically, this is illustrated in proximal demonstra-
tives being associated with the moment of speech, as in (12) and (13). 
 
(12) You can not trust anybody WKHVHWKRVHGD\V

(13) 7KRVH""WKHVHwere the days. 

A related interpretation can be found in the temporal order of the objects 
referred to by demonstratives. There is a strong association between QHDU-
IDU and ILUVW-VHFRQG, witness the following examples:  
 
(14) We just talked about WKLVand WKDWWKDWand WKLV
 
(15) +HUHand WKHUH7KHUHand KHUHthere were bodies lying on the street. 
 
The acceptability judgments in (14) and (15) are congruent with the obser-
vation in my Dutch data that all intrasentential contrastive demonstratives 
have the WKLVWKDWorder. 
 
1HDUIDUvs. XQLTXHPXOWLSOH
 From an embodiment perspective on language and meaning, the QHDUIDU
scheme naturally extends to scales indicating differences in uniqueness, 
centrality, accuracy, concreteness and visibility. 1HDUobjects are by default 
more central, the QHDUregion is smaller and unique compared to all possi-
ble peripheral regions, and QHDUobjects are more visible and can be viewed 
more accurately than IDUobjects.  
The uniqueness of the QHDU region is reflected in the absence of con-
trastive intrasentential WKLVWKLV demonstratives in the corpus, and in the 
presence of WKDWWKDWcombinations. Likewise, WKDWWKDWbut not WKLVWKLV
can be used to refer to the same object in the same unit, as is demonstrated 
in (16) and (17), which are part of a thinking aloud protocol in which hy-
pertext users were asked to verbalize their computer task.  
 
(16) Oh, GLWkan ik aanklikken, dus GDWklik ik maar aan (MW-7-155) 
Oh, I can click on WKLVWKDWso I click on WKDWWKLV.  
 
(17) He, he, GDWGLWwas GDWGLW






In a large number of cases, demonstratives can be claimed to express dif-
ferences in accuracy or concreteness. But these cases require rhetorical 
support and analytical explanation, as they are not based on 
(un)acceptability judgments like in most examples above. For example, in 
the Dutch corpus, WKDWis almost exclusively used when the object is vague 
(e.g. cases like ‘and all WKDW¶), but in most of these cases, the proximal vari-
ant is possible as well.  
 
1HDUIDUvs. VXUIDFHGHSWK
An interesting extension can be found in the discourse deictic use of WKLV
and WKDW. In many of these cases, WKLVand WKDWdo not produce clear-cut ac-
ceptability differences. But the clear cases reveal an interesting association 
of WKLVwith surface pointing and WKDWwith deep(er) processing.  
 
(18) <caption of picture in newspaper> 7KLV (*7KDW photograph shows Mbeki to-
gether with Jacob Zuma. 
 
(19) 7KLV (7KDWtable shows the average conditions in South Africa. 
 
(20) 7KLV""7KDWtitle refers to the early years of Apartheid. 
 
(21) 7KLVWKDW book, section, chapter, sentence is about sex. 
 
(22) 7KLV (*WKDW) is the list of ancestors of Jesus Christ, a descendant of David, who 
was a descendent of Abraham: …” (gospel according to Matthew. 
 
(23) 7KLVWKDW is what we shall do: ….. 
 
(24) Ik was helemaal van de kaart of hoe zeg je GDW""GLW 
I was really flabbergasted or how do you say WKDW""WKLV

(25) En Douglas Hurd zal in Cannes dus zeker een beetje sneuvelen, als GDW""GLW 
tenminste kan 
And Douglas Hurd will certainly die a little bit in Cannes, if that is possible. 
 
(26) H.R. is barkeeper-op-rust en ervan overtuigd GLH""GH]H te vinden onder de 
vliegtuigen. 
H.R. is barkeeper-on-rest (retired) and convinced to find WKDW (*WKLV) [that rest, 
AM] underneath the air planes 
(27) [Interview with Jonathan Porritt, then leader of the environmental pressure group 
Friends of the Earth, by Nicholas Witchell, BBC Radio 5, 16 October 1994] 
NW:  do you think that he [Prince Charles] will become a green monarch ? 






  NW: -- what, that he will ever one day become king? 
  JP:   yes (Cornish, 2001) 

As (18)-(23) show, WKLVand not WKDWis able to point at the surface repre-
sentation of an information object in discourse, be it a photograph, a table, 
a paragraph title, a part of the discourse or a discourse chunk that is coming 
up (i.e. the cataphorically used discourse deixis). In (24)-(27) discourse 
deictic WKDW tends to refer to deeper levels of processing (propositions, 
events, inferences) and invites the activation of additional knowledge to 
solve the reference. These interpretations live on the VXUIDFHGHHS exten-
sion of the QHDU-IDU scheme. 
These examples are not exhaustive, and they are not conclusive. Still 
they strongly suggest the relevance of metaphorical extensions of the QHDU
IDU image scheme as cognitive basis for the interpretation of demonstra-
tives. 
 
 ,QYHVWLJDWLQJ WKH LQWHUDFWLRQ RI VSDWLDO DQG FRQFHSWXDO LQWHUSUHWD
WLRQVRIGHPRQVWUDWLYHV
Despite the plausibility of analyzing demonstratives in terms of metaphoric 
space, existing data and methods used in the two research traditions are not 
able to ultimately test how spatial and conceptual interpretations interact, 
i.e. to find conceptual (social, relational, emotional etc.) sediments in spa-
tial demonstratives, as well as spatial relics in non-space based demonstra-
tives. 
Cross-linguistic research largely relies on explicit intuitions of native 
speakers or descriptions of grammarians, the accuracy of which is not al-
ways guaranteed. Explicit elicitation, e.g. on the basis of field manual in-
structions, is fairly reliable when demonstratives are only dependent on the 
spatial configuration of objects and participants. More fine-grained factors, 
such as the attitude of participants towards each other or towards objects, 
can hardly be elicited systematically that way, not only because the elicita-
tion tools do not take these factors into account, but also because the judg-
ments on pragmatic associations are too subtle to be explicitly answered by 
naïve language users.  
The grammars, on the other hand, do not provide a refined enough 





for a well-recorded language like Dutch, the pragmatic associations as de-
scribed in Kirsner (1979) or Maes (1996) are largely absent in Dutch 
grammars, which I presume applies a fortiori to linguistically less well 
chronicled languages in the world.  
The claims about derived pragmatic functions of demonstratives are 
mainly substantiated by expert analyses of attested or constructed exam-
ples, often complemented by quantitative evidence. Despite the frequent 
spatial metaphors used to explain these pragmatic functions, there is no 
conclusive evidence about the spatial sediment in these demonstratives.  
The interaction of spatial and conceptual interpretation aspects of de-
monstrative meaning needs to be studied in a more controlled setting, in 
which language users are asked to refer to objects which not only differ in 
terms of space, but also in terms of prominence. In a series of experiments 
which are currently being carried out, we use a simple game to create a 
natural environment for such a set up. We ask children to find differences 
in two apparently identical visual scenes. The two visuals have a different 
distance to the viewer (one right in front of the child, the other further away 
either within or outside arm reach). The scenes represent different concep-
tual distances (nearby vs. further away perspective). And the differences 
are either normal (e.g. a shirt with horizontal or vertical stripes), or marked 
(e.g. an elephant with four or five legs), thus inducing a difference in object 
prominence between the two visuals. In a next phase, the attitude towards 
objects will be manipulated systematically (e.g. the evil witch vs. the good 
fairy) using the same task. That way, we hope to gradually unravel the in-
teraction of spatial and conceptual interpretation aspects of demonstratives. 
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